is an open and optimized protocol developed for the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems supporting the utilities industries. The DNP3 enables the Master Station to request data from Substations using pre-defined control function commands and Substations to respond by transmitting the requested data. DNP3 was never designed with security mechanisms in mind and therefore the protocol itself lacks any form of authentication or encryption. Discussion so far has been centered on two solutions to provide security for SCADA: cryptographic technologies placed at each end of the communication medium, or security enhancements placed directly in the protocol. This paper recommends a new Distributed Network Protocol Version 3 Security (DNPSec) framework to enable confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity placed directly in the DNP3. Such framework requires some modifications in the data structure of the DNP3 Data Link layer. Our main goal is to address the threats related to confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity in the DNP3 as part of SCADA architecture, with a minimum performance impact on the communication link; and without requiring modification to the much more expensive Master Station and Substation devices and the applications supporting them.
control communications traffic is carried on public networks [12] . According to a Newton-Evans report, nearly 40% of the utilities responding either currently use or plan to use the Internet for SCADA [24] .
Distributed Network Protocol Version 3 (DNP3) is used by SCADA systems to communicate between the Master host and the Slave units. This infrastructure is open, and effective authentication or encryption mechanisms does not exist. Although the utilities have increased their attention on improving the security and reliability of the SCADA systems in recent years, many owners and operators do not yet have the technology, tools, capabilities, and/or resources needed to secure their systems. Discussion so far has been centered on two solutions to provide security for SCADA: Encryption/decryption technologies placed at each end of the communication media, or security enhancements placed directly in the protocol [5] . To solve the problem of providing a solution placed at each end of the communication media, American Gas Association (AGA 12) [1] developed a standard for "Cryptographic Protection of SCADA Communications." Our paper recommends a new security framework to enable confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity directly in the DNP3. Such a framework requires some modifications in the data structure of the DNP Data Link layer.
The main goal behind our approach is to address the threats related to confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity in the SCADA Systems using the DNP3 with a minimum performance impact on the communication link, and without requiring modification to the much more expensive Master Station and Substation units and the applications supporting them. Our framework is built along the lines of the IPSec standards [16] , [17] , [18] , [26] , but has some unique features to maintain the specifications and the requirements of the DNP3 and SCADA architecture.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 summarizes related work. Section 3 describes the DNPSec framework by proposing security enhancements placed directly in DNP3. Section 4 concludes our paper. We added 4 appendices to the paper to help in providing background on SCADA and DNP. Appendix A provides a brief overview of SCADA systems. Appendix B provides a brief overview of DNP3. Appendix C provides threats analysis for SCADA systems using DNP3. And finally, Appendix D provides an analysis of our approach.
Related Work
Few publications are available on SCADA security, such as the American Gas Association Report No. 12 (AGA 12) [1] . AGA 12 recommends practices designed to protect SCADA's Master-Slave serial communication links from a variety of active/passive cyber attacks. One of these standards is AGA 12-1, Cryptographic Protection of SCADA Communications. The solution protects against hijacking or modifying the communication channel.
AGA 12 requires the installation of multi-channel SCADA Cryptographic Modules (SCM) on a communications channel between the SCADA unit (e.g., host, RTU, IED) and the modem. A SCM receives and transmits SCADA messages on two communication ports: plaintext port and ciphertext port. The plaintext port is used to receive and transmit plaintext messages from a SCADA unit to a SCM, and the ciphertext port is used to transmit and receive ciphertext messages from a SCM to its peer.
SCM immediately begins transmitting a ciphertext message header to its peer as soon as it receives the first SCADA message characters. When it receives enough characters to fill its cipher block, it encrypts and transmits a block of ciphertext. When it finished transmitting all message blocks, it transmits a trailer that includes a Message Authentication Code (MAC).
At the receiving SCM, an incoming ciphertext message header signals the start of a new message. Each time enough characters are received on the ciphertext port to fill a cipher block, the SCM decrypts the block and immediately begins forwarding the decrypted characters via its plaintext port to the receiving SCADA unit. When the trailer of the ciphertext message is received, the SCM computes and checks the MAC. By this time, the decrypted SCADA message may have already been forwarded in its entirety to the receiving SCADA unit. If the authentication check fails, it is too late to prevent forwarding the unauthentic message. Thus the authentication code only alerts the SCM to a possible failure of data integrity [37] . Such solution is limited and expensive. The standard does not protect an attack from a compromised field site or control center. In addition, SCADA owners need to install AGA 12 compliance multi-channel SCADA Cryptographic Module (SCM) and Key Management Appliance in the SCADA Control Center; and SCM and Maintenance Cryptographic Module attached to every Remote Terminal Unit (RTU). Moreover, AGA 12 is still in the early stages from a system implementation standpoint. Key management is a key component of the standards and is still in the development stage.
In another research, Graham and Patel [25] examined three security enhancements in SCADA communications to reduce the vulnerability of cyber attacks to include: (1) solutions that wrap the DNP3 protocols without making changes to the protocols, (2) solutions that alter the DNP3 protocols fundamentally, and (3) enhancements to the DNP3 application. One of the research directions they identified is to secure the DNP3 protocol which is the focus of this paper. They provided high level description of possible solutions to protect SCADA communications and analysis for existing solutions such as DNP3 over IPSec or DNP over SSL/TLS. The main purpose of the paper is to identify the possible solutions to secure SCADA messages for further research work to model and proof these solutions. The discussion about providing security for the DNP protocol is theoretical and describes the features of the proposed protocol at a very high level.
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems
See appendix A.
Distributed Network Protocol Version 3
See appendix B.
Threats Analysis for SCADA Systems
See appendix C.
Distributed Network Protocol Version 3 Security (DNPSec) Framework
DNPSec authentication and integrity framework capabilities will verify the frame origin, assure that the frame sent is the frame received, assure that the network headers have not changed since the frame was sent, and give anti-replay protection. DNPSec confidentiality framework capability will encrypt frames to protect against eavesdropping and hide frame source by applying encryption methods. Some modifications to the DNP3 LPDU or frame structure are required to provide these capabilities.
CRC is a common technique used in DNP3 for detecting data transmission errors. CRCs occupy 34 bytes out of 292 bytes of the DNP3 LPDU for integrity. These bytes will be utilized in a different way in the DNPSec framework.
There are two main components of the DNPSec. The first is the DNPSec structure to construct the frame and transfer data in secure mode between the Master and the Slave. The second is the key exchange established during the installation and connection setup between the Master and the Salve.
DNPSec structure
DNPSec consists of five fields (as shown in Figure 6 -1) the new header, the key sequence number, the original LH header, the payload data, and the authentication data. The new header is an unsigned 4 bytes field containing the destination address (DA) which occupies 2 bytes; the MH flag bit to recognize if the message is coming from the Primary Master host (0) or from the Secondary Master Host (1); the SK flag bit to indicate to the Slave if the message contains the new session key (1) or to decrypt the message using the session key in the S-keydb (0); and 14 bits reserved.
The key sequence number is an unsigned 4 bytes field containing a counter value that increases by one for each message sent by the Master. Each time a Master sends a message it increments the counter by one and places the value in the key sequence number field. Thus, the first value to be used is 1. The Master must not allow the key sequence number to cycle past 2 32 -1 back to zero. If the limit of 2 32 -1 is reached, the Master should terminate the session key and send a new key to the Slave using the value zero in the frame sequence number. This kind of functionality will guarantee that the Master and the Slave will continue establishing a new session key even if the connection is always open. Moreover, the security policy should indicate that a new session key must be established between the Master and the Slave in case the Slave used the same session key for a certain time period. DNPSec uses the variable key-session-life-time to keep track of the life span of the session key.
The original LH header (DNP3 data link header without the 2 CRCs) and the payload data is protected by encryption and composed of 264 bytes field containing , 8 link protocol data unit header bytes, 250 Transport Protocol Data Unit bytes, and 6 padding dummy bytes. 264 bytes is a multiple of 4 bytes, which provides alignment of 4 bytes boundary and provides boundaries of 64 bits to support the encryption algorithms. For example, Data Encryption Standard (DES) specifies that the plaintext is 64 bits in length and the key is 56 bits in length. Longer plaintext are processed in 64-bit blocks.
The authentication data field containing an Integrity Check Value (ICV) computed over the key sequence number, the original LH header, and the payload data fields. ICV provides integrity services and is provided by a specific message authentication algorithm (MAC) such as, HMAC-MD5-96 or HMAC-SHA-1-96. The integrity algorithm specification must specify the length of the ICV and the comparison rules and processing steps for validation. DNPSec required 20 bytes for the authentication data field. To simplify the key management process, we are recommending to use the Master/Slave encryption/decryption session key to calculate the authentication data.
The DNPSec fields are as follows: 
Key management
The key management operations in DNPSec are very simple to accommodate the static nature of the SCADA environment. They occur during the configuration of the Primary Master host, the Secondary Master host, and the Slaves to establish the initial connection between them; after the re-initialization of the Key Sequence Number (KSN) to generate and distribute a new key to the hosts; and after the timeout of the usage of the session key.
The Master host generates and manages a secure database "M_Keydb" for the shared session keys with the Slaves (see Figure 6 -2). The database consists of four fields: the Slave address used as an index key to the database, the shared session key, the time stamp used to limit the usage of the shared key for a certain pre-defined time period, and the Key Sequence Number. The Master calls "M_GenKey" to generate a unique session key when the old session key expired. "M_PutKey" is the function used to insert the new session key into the database. And the M_PutKSN is the function used to insert the new KSN into the database.
The Slave needs to maintain two session keys, one for communicating with the Primary Master host and the other for the Secondary Master host (see Figure 6 -2). It manages a secure database "S_Keydb" for the shared session keys with the Master hosts. The database consists of three fields and two records: (0, Primary Master Session Key, Key Sequence Number and 1, Secondary Master Session Key, Key Sequence Number). The simple "S_PutKey" is the function used to update the database with a new session key and the "S_PutKSN is the function used to update the database with a new KSN. See appendix E for our approach to implement the DNPSec protocol.
Discussion
See appendix D for our discussion.
Conclusion
DNP3 was not designed with security capabilities in mind. The SCADA vendors can build such capabilities by utilizing the DNPSec framework with a minimum time and cost without a major impact on the systems components and the application supporting them. This paper has discussed what DNPSec framework is, the components that constitute DNPSec, how DNPSec works, and provided analysis to our approach. The framework enables confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity in the DNP3. Such a framework requires some enhancements in the data structure of the DNP3 Data Link layer, without requiring modification to the Master Station and Substation devices and the applications supporting them. Confidentiality and integrity are achieved by encrypting frames between the Master and the Slaves using a common session key assigned at the setup time of the SCADA components. A new session key is established when the frame sequence number reaches the value 2 32 -1 or when the time period for the use of the session key is expired.
Authentication is achieved by applying authentication techniques to assure that the sender of the frame is what it claims to be. Proof of concept by testing or simulation could be a future topic worth investigation.
Our ongoing work address performance issues are related to the implementation of DNPSec. Draft 12/19/2005 Appendix A: Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems SCADA systems are real-time process controls that enable a user from a single Master station to collect and analyze data received from one or more Slave units, send limited control instructions, monitor and control equipment status, and open and shut valves or motors. It is used to control power generation, electricity transmission & distribution, electric utilities, natural gas utilities, oil & gas production facilities, water utilities, and gas stations/gas pumps.
A SCADA system consists of four major components: (1) the Field Instrumentations that measures the environmental conditions (read temperatures, pressures, flows, voltages, currents, frequencies, or other physical quantities) and controls valves, circuit breakers, or other devices that influence the physical processes, (2) the Remote Stations (Remote Terminal Unit), (3) the Control Center, and (4) The RTUs located in the remote station poll many direct-wired field instruments. The RTUs are used for reporting data and controlling the remote devices. The RTUs collect and concentrate the data from the field instruments for transfer to the Master Station. The SCADA server using Human Machine Interface located in the control center polls the RTUs at a user defined polling rate over several communication links (Fiber, Radio, Modem, Microwave, Telephone, Wireless, Powerline Carrier, and Internet). The SCADA server is programmed to collect and reformat data from the remote sites and detect alarm messages reported by the RTUs. Alarm messages are reported when a status of an end point changed unexpectedly.
Several protocols are used to transmit messages between SCADA components. The following is a list of some of these protocols: SCADA messages comprise commands, responses, acknowledgments, negative acknowledgments, keep-alive messages, etc. We will discuss these further in the next section. Draft 12/19/2005 Appendix B: Distributed Network Protocol Version 3 DNP3 supports two kinds of data: static data and event data. Static data is called class 0 data. Event data can have three different classes or priorities: 1 (high priority), 2 (medium priority) and 3 (low priority). Also, it supports several data types, e.g. "binary input" and "analog input", and the corresponding events, e.g. "binary input change" and "analog change". DNP3 protocol uses two message sets. The Master set, contains the valid commands for Master initiation a request (polling) or issuing command confirmation, and the Slave set, contains the valid commands to provide a response or initiation unsolicited messages. Messages can be sent between the DNP3 Master (Control Center) and the Slave (RTU) by one of the following communication operating modes [8] :
Quiescent Operation. In this mode the Master does not poll the Slave. The Slave can send unsolicited report-by exception messages and the Master can send application layer confirmations to the Slave. During quiescent periods the device can be placed in an idle state. Unsolicited Report-by-Exception Operation. The communication is basically, unsolicited but the Master occasionally sends integrity polls for Class 0 data to verify that its database is up to date. Polled Report-by-Exception Operation. The Master regularly polls for event data and occasionally for Class 0 data. Static Report-by-Exception Operation. The Master polls only for Class 0 data or the specific data it requires.
The Master can address individual Slaves, or can initiate a broadcast message to all Slaves. Slaves return a message (response) to requests that are addressed to them individually. The DNP3 protocol establishes the format for the Master's request message by placing it into the Slave (or broadcast) address, a function code defining the requested action, any data to be sent, and an error-checking field. The Slave's response message is also constructed using DNP3 protocol. It contains fields confirming the action taken (if requested), any data to be returned, and an errorchecking field. If an error occurred in receipt of the message, or if the Slave is unable to perform the requested action, the Slave will construct an error message and send it as its response. The request message is contained in the application layer information within the message. A confirmation (acknowledge) response is required to this message. The Slave station sends an ACK message to the Master.
Since the last transaction contained an application level request for the transmission of data, the Slave station then performs the action requested and initiates a communication with the requested data. The application layer specification describes the message format, attributes, services, and procedures for the application layer. The application layer listens and builds messages based on the need for or the availability of user application data. When the data to be transmitted is too large for a single application layer message, multiple independent application layer messages may be built and transmitted sequentially. Each application layer is referred to as a fragment and a message may either be a single-fragment message or a multi-fragment message. Once messages are built, the application layer presents a buffer containing an application layer fragment to the pseudo-transport layer for segmentation.
The application layer initially forms the data into blocks of application service data units (ASDU). The application messages contain both function codes, and data objects. Function codes define what the meaning and purpose of a message. The data objects define the structure and interpretation of the data itself. The ASDU is made up of one or more object header and data object fields with up to a maximum size of 2048 byte.
The application layer then creates the application protocol data units (APDU) by adding a message header to the ASDU. The header has 2 bytes or 4 bytes depending on if the message is a request or a response, respectively. The application header is referred to as the application protocol control information (APCI). The response header includes an additional two-byte field designated internal indications (IIN). When a request cannot be processed due to formatting errors or the requested data is not available, the IIN is always returned with the appropriate bits set. The other two components of the header are the application control (AC) and the function code (FC). The AC is used to control the communication flow. It has three bits or flags, plus a sequence number. The flags are used to indicate if the fragment is one of a multi-fragment message, if an application layer confirmation is requested for the Draft 12/19/2005 fragment, and if the fragment was unsolicited. The application layer sequence number allows the receiving application layer to detect fragments that are out of sequence, or dropped fragments.
The FC is the second byte of the APCI. It follows the AC byte in both the request header and the response header. The FC indicates the purpose, or requested operation, of the message. The header function code applies to all object headers, and therefore all data within the message fragment. For example, function code 7 represents the immediate freeze function. When such function code is coded in the control function code, the Master is asking the Slave to copy the specified objects to a freeze buffer and respond with status of the operation. The rest of the function codes could be found in the DNP Users Group documentations.
The pseudo-transport layer specification describes the segment format, attributes, services, and functions for the pseudo-transport layer. The main function of the transport layer is to disassemble application layer fragments into data link layer sized data units (segments) for transmission and to reassemble these units into the original application fragment on reception. It listens and builds segments based on the need for or the availability of the fragment data. It breaks the application protocol data units down into multiple data segments called transport protocol data units (TPDU). The maximum size of the TPDU is 250 bytes. It consists of 1 byte transport header followed by a maximum of 249 bytes of data. The transport header indicates if the segment is the first segment of the fragment using the FIN field (FIN = 0 indicates more segments follow, FIN = 1 indicates the final segment in a series of segments), the last segment of a fragment using the FIR field (FIR = 0 indicates this is not the first segment in a series of segments, FIR = 1 indicates this is the first segment in a series of segments), or a single segment. The transport header also includes a rolling segment sequence number to verify that segments are received in the correct order and guards against duplicated or missing segments. It has a range of 0 to 63. Sequence numbers increment by one count modulo 64, for each segment in a series of segments that hold an application layer fragment. After sequence number 63, the next value is 0.
The data link layer manages the logical link between the Master and the Slave and it improves the physical channel error characteristics. It adds a 10 bytes header block (block 0) followed by optional data blocks to constitute the link protocol data unit (LPDU) or frame of up to 292 bytes in length. If more than 16 user data bytes follow block 0, each block must contain 16 bytes of data except the last block. Each data block has 2 CRC bytes appended to it, See Figure 4 The header block fields, Figure 4 -4, consists of two "sync" bytes that help the receivers determine where the frame begins; one "length" byte that specifies the number of bytes in the remainder of the frame, not including Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) check bytes; one "link control" byte used between sending and receiving link layers to coordinate their activities; two "destination address" bytes; two "source address" bytes; and two bytes for cyclic redundancy check. The data section is commonly called the payload and contains the data passed down from the pseudo-transport layer. to. DNP3 allows for addresses from 0 -65534 for individual device identification, with the address 65535 defined as an all Slave units address to send broadcast commands such as freeze counters to all units on a communication channel. The main purpose of the DNP3 data link layer is to convert the TPDU into one frame (LSDU) to transfer the frame across the physical link, and to provide indications of other events such as link status.
Finally, the physical layer converts each frame into a bit stream and sends it over to a physical media. In another configuration, the TCP/IP protocols are used to provide transport of the DNP3 messages over the network, such configuration is called adaptation layer.
The following example (Figure 4-6) illustrates the three layer functions. Application layer byte numbers are shown inside the elements. a. The user application generates a message with the appropriate function code and data objects to poll the right information from the remote station. The message size is 600 bytes. The application layer receives the message from the user application function and reformats the message to fragments.
The application layer functions:
Draft 12/19/2005 a. Since the message size is less than 2048 bytes, the application layer will form one fragment. b. It adds 2 bytes header to the message since this is a polling message, one byte for the application control and the second byte for the function code. c. The values in the application control byte [FIR FIN CON SEQ-NUM] could be as follows: [1 1 0 01001], the code indicates that the message is one fragment (1 1), no confirmation required (0), with 9 (01001) as the sequence number (solicited request) value d. The function code value could be as follows: [0000001] , this function requests from the substation to respond with requested data objects. e. The application layer transmits the fragment to the pseudotransport layer for assembly. Now the size of the fragment is 602 bytes.
3. The pseudo-transport layer functions: The pseudo-transport layer breaks the fragment to segments. Each segment will consist of 1 byte transport header and 249 bytes of data. a. Accordingly, 3 segments will be assembled as follows: (1), it is not the first segment (0), and 22 (010110) is the sequence number. b. The pseudo-transport layer transmits the three segments to the data link layer to form the frames by adding the link header to each segment.
4. The data link layer functions: The data link layer builds the contents of the three frames by adding 10 bytes data link header (block 0) and 282 user data. a. The frame format will be as follows: [(start:2) The best way to protect a communications network is the correct and conscious use of cryptographic and authentication suites at the DNP3 Data Link layer in both the master (client) and the slave (server) ends. Draft 12/19/2005 Appendix D: Discussion
Analysis of our approach
Reliability and time to delivery of DNP3 frames are very important requirements for SCADA/DNP3 Systems. These requirements are vital to market acceptance of a particular DNP3 security implementation. Reliability, as per DNP Group, is provided by Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) function in the Data Link Layer. CRC is noncryptographic mechanism for detecting transmission errors. DNPSec added more efficient reliability and security capabilities by introducing cryptographic and authentication capabilities in the DNPSec framework. Such capabilities introduced new challenges related to time to delivery of the frames. But we will show soon that these challenges are not significant and our framework maintains a good balance between security, reliability and time to deliver since most of the frames in the SCADA systems are not real-time sensitive.
As we described in section 4, DNP3 provides several different means of retrieving data. These methods for retrieving data require different means of efficiency, quiescent and unsolicited report-by-exception operation requires real-time efficiency. The time of retrieving data from the Slave or the time the Slave needs to send unsolicited messages to the Master should not be significantly delayed by the implementation of DNPSec. More detailed performance analysis related to the implementation of DNPSec needs to be conducted.
Several performance studies on the effect of cryptography on the set-up time and the delivery of the messages from one end to the other indicate that the delay is not significant based on the advanced technologies in the communication networks, processing power at the end systems, and the cryptographic algorithms [10] , [22] , [30] .
In a study by Kim and Montgomery [19] Based on the performance information above, we will calculate the worst case scenario to measure the time of delivery for the unsolicited message from the Slave to the Master, which required real-time delivery. Although, the numbers are far from exact, they should be usable as a first approximation. The total time to deliver such message is the sum of the encryption speed (ES), the decryption speed (DS), encryption key set up (EK), decryption key set up (DK), and the transmission time (TT).
Unsolicited delivery time = ES + DS + EK + DK + TT
We assume that the size of the DNPSec message is 292 bytes, Triple DES is the algorithm of choice with 112 bit key, the network bandwidth is 1.5 Mbps, and the performance speed is measured in kbit/s. The EK and DK are not applicable in our case since we are assuming that we are using manual distribution of the session keys during the installation of SCADA components. The As a result the unsolicited delivery time is equal to .00034 sec. Even if we double this number to accommodate for the authentication calculation time, we believe that this is a very minimum time to have an effect on the delivery time of the unsolicited messages in the SCADA systems. Accordingly, adding the operations above to include cryptographic and authentication operations will not affect the efficiency and the speed of delivery of DNP3 messages.
Attack Analysis
Let's re-visit the man-in-the middle or the eavesdropping attack [36] described in section 5, DNPSec protects the frames between the Master and the Slaves as follows: only the Master and the Slave can read the content of the frames exchanged. A message sent from Master to Slave cannot be changed in transit (assuring integrity of the data exchanged). Master and Slave need to authenticate each other (Slave can make sure the Master is truly Master (rather than the Intruder).
DNPSec uses the fact that during installation and setup of the SCADA components a copy of the session keys stored in the Master and all Slaves to ensure protection against man-in-the-middle-attacks. When the session key expires (frame sequence Draft 12/19/2005 number reaches 2 32 -1 or the time period using the same key reached), the Master sends a new session key to the Slave encrypted with the previous session key, and the attacker cannot recover the session key without the previous session key.
Appendix E provides SCADA / DNP3 over IP comparison. Draft 12/19/2005 Appendix E: SCADA / DNP3 over IP Several SCADA vendors have successfully implemented SSL/TLS (Security Sockets Layer /Transport Layer Security) in their applications. The implementation is provided by wrapping DNP3 with SSL/TLS protocols in the transport layer level. For example, Bow Networks eLAN SSL/TLS module is currently available with DNP3 to provide secure communications in SCADA architecture [2] . Also, California Independent System Operator (ISO) in their "Remote Intelligent Gateway (RIG) Technical Specification" recommends the usage of SSL/TLS to their members [4] .
SCADA/DNP3 security can also be provided by wrapping DNP3 with Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) in the Network layer. For example, Bow Networks eLAN VPN is currently available to support DNP3 in secure communications. The eLAN VPN is a stand alone application which provides a secure tunnel between two sites at the IP layer. The eLAN VPN solution is based on IPSec [2].
A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed solution, DNP3 frame with IPSec, and DNP3 frame with SSL/TLS is given in Table 7-1. 
